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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
burden thus placed on insurance companies the public is the ultimate sufferer
because of the high insurance rates sure to follow.' 2 The Texas holding
alleviates considerably the problem in such a situation. Those who oppose
it dislike the undue favor which they allege has been bestowed on insurance
companies by legislatures.
It has also been urged in some quarters as a criticism of the common
law view that an analogy should be drawn from the gratuitous bailee cases,
where liability exists only as a result of gross negligence."3 This thesis is
based on the theory that he who undertakes to perform a duty gratuitously
should not be under the same measure of obligation as he who enters upon
the same undertaking for pay.14
One unusual case refutes the common law view on the ground that it is
"unsportsmanlike" and puts an undue burden on the driver. It was also
maintained in that case that such a rule works against public policy inas-
much as it tends to discourage the giving of rides to those who are in need
and deserving of the same.' 5
Criticism of the common law theory will apply a fortiori to the stricter
Missouri view. It is suggested, therefore, that Missouri revise its present
statutory enactment so as specifically to exclude the driver from being held
to the highest degree of care as to his gratuitous guest. The substitution
of the gross negligence doctrine is to be recommended.
C. T. D.
TORTS--HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE AS A DEFENSE--[Texas].-In Char-
bonneau v. Hupaylo' the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that the plain-
tiff could not recover from a defendant driver who negligently turned his
car across the path of the plaintiff's following car, if the facts showed that
the plaintiff could have avoided the accident after discovering the defendant
in a position of peril. Cases rarely arise in which the discovered peril or
last clear chance doctrine is utilized as a defense.2 The English3 and
12. Cf. comment, 12 Texas L. Rev. 303 (1933).
13. Goddard, Outlines of Bailments and Carriers, (2d ed. 1928) 44; Sales
v. Funk, 175 Mo. App. 500, 161 S. W. 1175 (1913) ; Adler v. Planter's Hotel
Co., 181 S. W. 1062 (Mo. 1916).
14. Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 22 Mass. 487, 118 N. W. 168 (1917).
15. O'Shea v. Lavay, 175 Wis. 456, 185 N. W. 525, 20 A. L. R. 1008,
1010 (1921); comment, 18 Calif. L. Rev. 184 (1929).
1. 100 S. W. (2d) 745 (Tex. Dec. 1936).
2. Comment, 14 Boston U. L. Rev. 850 (1934).
3. Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East. 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809). The
plaintiff was riding along the road on horseback and was injured when he
ran into an obstruction negligently left across the roadway by the defendant.
The court refused recovery, becoming the first court to enunciate the doc-
trine that a plaintiff who could have avoided the accident by the use of
ordinary care following defendant's negligence cannot recover. The decision
preceded by 33 years the case of Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 547, 152 Eng.
Rep. 588 (1842), which is now recognized as the leading case upon the
Last Clear Chance Doctrine.
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Virginia4 courts have expressly recognized the use of the doctrine in that
manner. Where such cases do arise it is often feasible for the courts to
dispose of them on other grounds; such as plaintiff's concurrent negligence
or his willful and wanton conduct.5 Whatever reasoning or terms the courts
employ, the fact remains that the plaintiff will be refused recovery because
of his wrongful conduct.6
Missouri lawyers may speculate as to what attitude their own courts
would take in applying the Humanitarian DoctrineT to facts similar to those
in the instant case. Would the court permit the Humanitarian Doctrine to
be invoked as a defense? The Missouri Courts have repeatedly said that
this doctrine rests upon the law's regard for human life.8 The law un-
doubtedly holds the same regard for human life whether it be that of a
plaintiff or a defendant. Surely then it would not be inconsistent for the
court to hold a plaintiff precluded from recovery for simple negligence when
the facts plainly indicate that he saw or should have seen defendant oblivi-
ously in or approaching9 a position of peril in sufficient time to have warned
the defendant of the danger.
Should such a set of facts arise in Missouri, an application of the Hu-
manitarian Doctrine as a defense would not work an injustice. Oblivious-
ness to peril is not an uncommon element in automobile accidents, and
should not work to the benefit of only one party where both are in control
of the same type of mechanical and dangerous instrument.10 Both plaintiff
and defendant should share equally the duty to protect human life. Although
it would not lessen the ease with which cases go to the jury11 under the
Humanitarian Doctrine, it would tend to strengthen the defense in the eyes
of the jury and thus probably prevent an indiscriminate return of plaintiff's
verdicts in automobile accidents.
L. H. B.
4. McNamara v. Rainey Luggage Corp. et al., 139 Va. 197, 123 S. B. 515
(1924).
5. 45 C. J., Negligence (1928) 988, sec. 540.
6. Island Express Inc. v. Frederick, 5 Harr. 569, 171 A. 181, (Del. 1934).
7. This doctrine, as it is frequently expressed by the Missouri courts, is
that a plaintiff may recover despite his own contributory negligence if the
defendant saw or should have seen the plaintiff in a position of peril in
sufficient time to have avoided the accident with the facilities and instru-
ments then at hand, and failed to do so. Alexander v. St. Louis San Fran-
cisco Ry. Co., 4 S. W. (2d) 888 (Mo. App. 1928); Banks v. Morris & Co.
302 Mo. 254, 257 S. W. 482 (1924).
8. Banks v. Morris & Co., supra, note 7.
9. The Missouri Supreme Court in the recent case of Perkings v. Termi-
nal Ry. Co. of St. Louis, 102 S. W. (2d) 915 (Mo. 1937) has further ex-
tended the Humanitarian Doctrine, holding that the defendant is liable if he
sees or should have seen plaintiff approaching a position of peril and failed
to warn him of his danger. See infra, p. 583.
10. Gaines, The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri (1935) 20 ST. Louis
LAW Ruviuw 113, 118.
11. ". . . As the Humanitarian rule exists today it is a very convenient
method of getting judgment for the plaintiff in almost any damage suit,
regardless of his contributory negligence." Ibid., 129.
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